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Abstract 
This paper examines the growing pressures and incentives encouraging research misconduct, along 
with the consequences, as illustrated by the case of business school research. Drawing on a review of 
the literature on different theoretical approaches to analysing organizational misconduct, we develop a 
formal taxonomy distinguishing appropriate conduct from blatantly inappropriate misconduct but with 
a specific focus on the ‘grey’ areas between these extremes in the form of questionable and 
inappropriate behaviour. We identify various sources of research misbehaviour and different 
categories of those affected. The aim is to provide a clearer understanding of what research behaviour 
is deemed appropriate or not, which stakeholders it affects, and the pressures and incentives likely to 
exacerbate such misconduct. We conclude with a discussion of how the taxonomy can help shape 
future good research practice (thereby setting a better example to students), and offer some 
propositions for future research. 
Keywords: research misconduct; taxonomy; inappropriate conduct; questionable conduct; 
competitive pressures; business schools 
Research Highlights 
We review different theoretical approaches to the analysis of organizational misconduct. 
We develop a taxonomy of different forms of research misconduct of varying severity. 
We identify various sources of research misconduct and different categories of those affected. 
We discuss how such a misconduct taxonomy can help shape future good research practice. 
We provide some testable propositions for investigation in future research. 
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1. Introduction 
Universities, like most institutions, are subject to growing performance pressures. 
Competition for tenure, research funding, publication ‘slots’ in elite journals, employment in 
leading universities, and reputation within the academic community are major drivers of 
individual or institutional success (Martin, 2016). However, a preoccupation with publishing 
in elite journals and counting citations may create perverse incentives (Bouter, 2015), 
encouraging efforts to ‘push’ or even transgress the boundaries of appropriate behaviour. 
Indeed, the number of articles retracted by journals has risen more than ten-fold in just ten 
years (Noorden, 2011).  Such ‘system gaming’ may enhance individuals’ chances in the 
competition for posts and funding, and the academic standing of the organization. Where 
some boundary has clearly been transgressed, this is regarded as ‘misconduct’. Yet as Butler 
el al. (2017) note, blatant misconduct such as fabrication, falsification and plagiarism 
constitutes only part of a much wider problem. Such blatant misconduct can be addressed, for 
example, through legal mechanisms, whereas the “less flagrant, more subtle cases of potential 
misconduct”, or what Fanelli (2009) and John et al. (2012) call ‘questionable research 
practices’, remain poorly understood. Moreover, there remains ambiguity about what types of 
research practices are questionable: “how scientists perceive the line separating ethical from 
unethical behavior is likely to exhibit a much more ambiguous character than existing 
research acknowledges” (Johnson and Ecklund, 2016, p.990), although some form of 
misrepresentation, inaccuracy or bias is generally involved (Steneck, 2006). 
We address this ambiguity by proposing a taxonomy of various forms of research behaviour, 
ranging from appropriate practice to blatant misconduct, specifically focusing on behaviour 
between these extremes that is ‘inappropriate’ or ‘questionable’. Our taxonomy differentiates 
between these categories based on the stakeholders affected by the misconduct as well as the 
severity, ranging from premeditated dishonesty and intentional rule-bending to less 
intentional poor behaviour that may arise due to complexity, sloppiness, ignorance or honest 
error. We provide examples drawn from business school research, where competitive 
pressures seem particularly acute. Our aim is to provide clearer and more consistent 
guidelines for researchers, especially junior scholars, as well as for journal editors and others 
responsible for monitoring and preventing academic misconduct. 
To develop our taxonomy1 of research misconduct, we draw on the organizational 
misconduct literature, which Greve et al. (2010) categorize as being derived primarily from 
rational choice, strain, cultural, network, and bounded rationality theories of misconduct. We 
provide illustrative examples (Siggelkow, 2007) from business school research, a field that, 
                                                 
1 Some distinguish between a ‘taxonomy’ and a ‘typology’, with the former being derived largely from data, and 
the latter based on categories derived from theory. The framework proposed here involves elements of both. 
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like others, has encountered growing problems with research misconduct (Honig and Bedi, 
2012). This is not to imply that business school research is more prone to misconduct, an 
issue on which systematic data is lacking.2 However, as we shall see, competitive pressures 
on business schools and their faculty are at least as severe as in many other areas, while the 
rewards for publishing in elite journals are often more lucrative. Furthermore, business school 
research has become so theoretically sophisticated and methodologically complex that its 
direct impact on business practice is often rather limited (Bennis and O’Toole, 2005; Banks 
et al., 2016). Consequently, the temptation to engage in questionable behaviour may be high, 
since academics may believe that the rewards outweigh the risks of detection, or that there is 
no direct impact on business, i.e. the ‘no harm, no foul’ convention applies, especially for 
ambiguous areas of misconduct. However, such a narrow perspective ignores the wider 
influence that business schools have on promulgating ethical decision-making in the business 
community (Floyd et al., 2013). Following Eisenhardt et al. (2016), we chose business school 
research because it provides a useful case for understanding ‘grey’ areas of misconduct by 
capturing certain key aspects, specifically why it occurs, whom it affects and why it matters 
to management education. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers the theoretical foundations of 
organizational misconduct, setting out different theoretical frameworks for analysing and 
understanding the forms of misconduct exhibited by academics and their organizations. 
Section 3 explains why we focus on business school research, while Section 4 introduces the 
entrepreneurial risk-return perspective on business school research. These more theoretical 
sections provide the foundations for developing a taxonomy of the various forms of research 
misconduct and other questionable behaviour (Section 5), the different sources of such 
misbehaviour (Section 6) and the main stakeholders affected (Section 7). Finally, Section 8 
summarizes the main conclusions and implications, including presenting propositions for 
further research. 
2. Theoretical foundations of organizational misconduct 
Misconduct does not happen in a vacuum but generally emerges from organizational or 
institutional pressures and incentives – what has been termed ‘organizational misconduct’. 
According to Vaughan (1999), with the rise of formal organizations have often come 
mistakes, misconduct and disasters, in other words the ‘dark side of organizations’. She 
argues that organizational misconduct occurs when individuals or groups violate internal or 
external rules, when attempts to engage in or encourage one type of behaviour unintentionally 
result in another, and by accident. 
                                                 
2 In his meta-review of the literature on research misconduct, the only field difference that Fanelli (2009, p.1) 
found was that “misconduct was reported more frequently by medical/pharmacological researchers than others”. 
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Greve et al. (2010, p.56) define organizational misconduct as “behavior in or by an 
organization that a social-control agent judges to transgress a line separating right from 
wrong; where such a line can separate legal, ethical, and socially responsible behavior from 
their antitheses”. A social-control agent is an actor representing a collective that can impose 
sanctions on behalf of that collective. Organizations may be judged by multiple agents, such 
as international, national and local governmental entities, as well as professional associations 
like the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, university ethics 
boards and in our case the Committee of Publishing Ethics (COPE). Greve et al. emphasize 
that their definition “avoids treating misconduct as a straightforward implication of a set of 
laws, ethical principles, and/or social norms” (ibid., p.56). Misconduct is thus essentially a 
social construct defined within the context of a particular group, and hence its interpretation 
may vary across groups and over time (see also Vaughan, 1999). 
According to Ashforth at al. (2008), research on misconduct needs to go beyond static 
individual traits and behaviour to include the role of processes and systems, as well as how 
individual, organizational and industrial levels interact to foster misconduct. Shadnam and 
Lawrence (2011, p.381) suggest that widespread misconduct, what they term ‘moral 
collapse’, results from the “breakdown of connections between moral communities, 
organizations and individuals which may be avoidable if actors work to establish or restore 
those connections”. Note that while there are numerous laws banning specific types of 
organizational misconduct, many types of behaviour are not illegal or are impractical to 
control through legal proceedings (Krawiec, 2005; Barnett, 2014), including the ambiguous 
‘questionable research practices’ (Fanelli, 2009; John et al., 2012; Johnson and Ecklund, 
2016) discussed here. In what follows, the unit of analysis includes both individual and 
organizational-level misconduct – and the processes and systems affecting these – with a 
particular focus on the relatively neglected non-legal ‘grey’ areas. 
In their literature review, Greve et al. (2010) note that organizational misconduct has been 
explored using numerous theoretical lenses, which they categorize into five areas: rational 
choice, strain, cultural, network and accidental. Their categorization is primarily drawn from 
organizational theory and related concepts common to business schools, and hence makes 
assumptions that may not be shared by other research traditions3 (for example, those in law, 
psychology or sociology).4 Nevertheless, it offers a reasonably comprehensive starting point 
to develop a taxonomy of research misconduct. 
                                                 
3 Shortage of space preclude us from going further into the limitations here – for a recent summary of the 
limitations of theory and research on organizational misconduct, see Palmer et al. (2016). 
4 For examples of legal, psychological and sociological approaches to aspects of gaming and misconduct, see 
Adams and Pimple (2005), Umphress et al. (2010), and Espeland and Sauder (2007) respectively. 
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The rational choice perspective includes agency, contract, and reputation theories that address 
the social control of individually rational actors. Drawing on Arrow (1963), Greve at al. 
argue that these theories have focused on inappropriate risk taking, accounts manipulation 
and blatant fraud, where “rational-action modeling assumes self-interested actors who need to 
be controlled in order not to choose actions that would be beneficial for them but harmful for 
transaction partners or third parties” (Greve et al., 2010, p.60). The rational choice 
perspective aligns closely with cost-benefit analysis as used in legal theories of misconduct. 
Drawing upon Becker’s (1968) economic model of crime and punishment, Hornuf and Haas 
(2014) note that an individual’s propensity to commit a crime is a function of the probability 
of conviction and the punishment that may follow compared with the utility gained from 
committing that crime. According to Krawiec (2005), legal-based systems that enforce 
organizations’ duties through compliance structures are likely to fail because courts lack 
sufficient information about the effectiveness of such structures. She argues that compliance-
based liability systems tend to encourage “cosmetic internal compliance structures that 
reduce legal liability without reducing the incidence of organizational misconduct” (ibid., 
p.572). In short, legal theories of misconduct may fail to deter organizational misconduct, 
generating costly but largely ineffective compliance structures. 
A more recent application of the rational choice perspective is tournament theory, a game-
theoretic view of principal-agent relations5 used to understand the causes of corporate 
misconduct, in particular those stemming from highly competitive promotion processes in 
organizations (Shi et al., 2016). Like agency and game theory, tournament theory is based on 
information asymmetry between principals and agents, and specifically the extent to which 
worker output can be monitored and how incentives can be used to align individual behaviour 
with organizational goals. However, the rational choice perspective, and in particular the 
influence of economic applications like agency theory, has been criticised for damaging the 
ethical behaviour of practitioners (Ghoshal, 2005; Kidwell and Kidwell, 2008). 
Greve et al.’s (2010) second area of organizational misconduct centres on strain theory, 
which posits that actors resort to misconduct when they fail to achieve their goals (or those 
imposed on them) through legitimate means. Originally formulated by Merton (1938) to 
understand why the impoverished were more likely to engage in illegal activities, strain 
theory has been used to explore how misalignment between goals and actual achievements 
may result in misconduct at the individual, organizational and societal level (Greve et al., 
2010). A related concept, general strain theory (Agnew, 1992), has been used by Lewellyn et 
al. (2017) to explore the phenomenon of conference paper ‘double dipping’. They suggest 
                                                 
5 For a summary of principal-agent models of organizational misconduct and their limitations, see Krawiec 
(2005). 
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that stressful circumstances create negative emotions, which may be alleviated by engaging 
in adaptive behavioural responses, including questionable conduct. 
The third approach examined by Greve et al. (2010) involves cultural theories of misconduct, 
again applied at various levels of analysis including occupations, professions, organizations, 
industries and societies. Organizational cultures incorporate certain norms, values and beliefs 
about which attitudes and behaviours are deemed appropriate and good. According to 
Monteduro et al. (2016), social norms can explain some of the causal factors of misconduct, 
which in turn are influenced by level of education, social development and national 
characteristics. 
In contrast to the rational choice perspective, Greve et al. (2010) observe that research on 
cultural causes of corruption often focuses on ethics rather than the procedural rules, threats 
or coercion. They further note that organizational cultures often implicitly encourage while 
simultaneously condemning misconduct, for example, motivating members to achieve 
particular ends without providing guidance on how these should be achieved, or by exhibiting 
a certain tolerance of rule-breaking and undue risk-taking in the guise of innovativeness. This 
can give rise to what Umphress et al. (2010) call ‘unethical pro-organizational behaviour’, 
where individuals attempt to justify their misconduct on the grounds that it helps their 
organisation. Such a culture may be exacerbated when there are pressures and rewards for 
extraordinary performance, and it is particularly influenced by the organization’s leadership 
(Schein, 1983; 1985). According to Sims and Brinkmann (2003), deep cultural flaws driven 
by leadership and veiled by ‘window-dressing ethics’ resulted in Enron’s collapse: “The 
culture at Enron eroded little by little, by the trespassing of ethical boundaries, allowing more 
and more questionable behaviour to slip through the cracks” (ibid., p.252). 
A culture of misconduct, however, does not explain variation in misbehaviour across 
organizational participants. This is the focus of Greve et al.’s (2010) fourth approach, 
network theories of organizational misconduct, which, as they note, “occupy an intermediate 
position between individual-level theories and the organizational-level theories” (p.68). This 
perspective focuses on misconduct among individuals linked by strong social ties but often 
rather isolated from other parts of the network, and on intentional collective efforts to 
deceive, such as price-fixing. According to Breit and Forsberg (2016), networks between 
researchers and stakeholders are increasingly common in contemporary academia, and may 
result in misconduct when, for example, actors are exposed to divergent expectations and 
pressures from different sources and organizational cultures. They note that “networks may 
influence people by providing information of practices (e.g., of how to do things or get away 
with things)” (ibid., p.8). 
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Grzesiuk (2016) suggests that research on network approaches to misconduct provides 
inconsistent results and tends to be based on static analyses rather than a dynamic approach 
that explores changes to networks over time. Network approaches do, however, address 
Ashforth at al.’s (2008) call to go beyond individual behaviour to include the role of 
processes and systems embedded within a system, as well as how individual, organizational 
and industrial levels interact to result in misconduct, and how all this may be shaped by 
social-control agents. Thus, network approaches link micro individual and group levels of 
analyses of misconduct (what Ashforth et al. (2008) call ‘bad apples’) with more macro 
organization, industry and national levels (i.e. ‘bad barrels’). 
Greve et al.’s (2010) final theoretical framework for analysing organizational misconduct 
addresses the link between accidents and misconduct, and is based on a recognition that 
organizations are complex while managers are limited in what they know (March and Simon, 
1958; Simon, 1969). Because of such bounded rationality, accidental misconduct may be 
inevitable (Vaughan, 1999). As we discuss below, complexity and bounded rationality are 
undoubtedly causes and sometimes even reasonable excuses to justify research misconduct, 
given the shift towards increasingly complicated methodological approaches, greater 
emphasis on collaborations with specialized expertise, and demands for greater outputs. They 
are therefore important factors in the rational choice perspective as well as in the strain, 
cultural and network theories of organizational misconduct. 
3. Business school research 
We focus here on business school research for several reasons. First, management education 
is fast growing and increasingly international (Honig et al., 2014; Morgeson and Nahrgang, 
2008). According to Universities UK International (Stern, 2017), UK business schools are by 
far the largest recipients of foreign students, more than double the next discipline 
(Engineering and Technology), offering lucrative growth opportunities to many universities. 
They also have low operating costs compared to disciplines that require expensive 
laboratories and equipment. At the same time, there is a high demand for business professors 
who have published in leading journals. Indeed, according to a recent survey, seven of the top 
ten highest paid professors in the US are affiliated with business schools6.  Business schools 
thus illustrate the highly competitive promotion processes in organizations that Shi et al. 
(2016) suggest may encourage misconduct. 
Second, business schools and their faculty are subject to intense competitive pressures from 
numerous accreditation schemes (e.g. AASCB, EQUIS, AMBA), as well as several 
influential ranking schemes such as those published by the Economist, Financial Times, US 
                                                 
6 http://www.thebestschools.org/blog/2013/11/25/10-highest-paid-college-professors-u-s/ (accessed on 13 
November 2017). 
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News & World Report, Wall Street Journal, Forbes and Bloomberg Business Week. Efforts to 
improve their ranking (and the indicators on which such rankings are based) frequently 
dominate a business school’s strategy in their attempts to attract the best students, staff and 
funding. 
Third, while there is an growing range of publication outlets for business school research, 
there are also strong career incentives and pressures to publish in a narrow range of leading 
journals, often determined by impact factors or elite rankings such as the Financial Times 
‘FT50’ list or the UT Dallas list of 24 leading management journals. Many universities link 
tenure and promotion directly to publications in such elite journals, most of which have a 
rejection rate of over 90%. Morgeson and Nahrgang (2008) discuss how elite journal lists 
have become extremely influential metrics for judging research performance, which along 
with other indicators are then used to rank the institutional quality and standing of business 
schools7, frequently with detrimental effects (Mingers and Willmott, 2013). As Langford et 
al. (2007) stress, research proxies are often oversimplified, failing to capture important paths 
of knowledge flow; hence, a preoccupation with readily available proxies can result in 
counterproductive activities, where the proxies become the de facto goals of institutions or 
individuals (see also Zimmerman, 2001; Gioia and Corley, 2002; Lawrence, 2008; Adler and 
Harzing, 2009). As Kerr (1975, p.779) warned over 40 years ago, a “fascination with an 
‘objective’ criterion” may well result in goal displacement, i.e. rewarding one specific 
behaviour while hoping for another. 
Yet such caution regarding proxies has seemingly been ignored in many business schools. 
For example, Honig et al. (2014, p.120) state: “Collectively, this heightened level of 
competition, preoccupation with rankings, and rising research expectations, has resulted in 
significantly increased pressure worldwide on faculty to publish in ‘top-tier’ journals”. They 
further note that intense competition among business schools has placed a premium on elite 
journal publications, which in turn is pressuring scholars to “see their work from an 
entrepreneurial perspective, driving them to consider the risk/return profile of the work they 
may wish to undertake” (ibid., p.124). 
More comprehensive journal lists are also used by specific countries to assess academic 
performance. These include the Australian Business Deans Council (ABDC) Journal Quality 
List, the German Academic Association for Business Research journal list (VHB-
JOURQUAL), and the UK-based Association of Business Schools (ABS) Academic Journal 
                                                 
7 See the second case study described in Annex A, in which a journal article analysing the relative publication 
performance of one business school reputedly played a significant part in obtaining a major endowment. The 
methodology was later questioned, and when it was revealed that the authors failed to declare they had worked 
at that school and that its director had helped draft the paper, the journal published an ‘expression of concern’. 
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Guide.8 In some cases, university funding is directly linked to publications in leading 
journals. For example, the allocation of research funds to universities by the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) is heavily determined by a periodic 
assessment exercise, the Research Excellence Framework (REF), which measures quality-
related research outputs such as journal publications.9 For many UK business schools, 
meeting REF criteria is incorporated into performance evaluations, where faculty promotions 
and salary increases are heavily influenced by publications in journals on the ABS list.10 
Pressures to publish, a preoccupation with elite journals as proxies for research excellence, 
and the potential for high rewards if successful are all likely to foster a more extreme 
entrepreneurial risk-return perspective, perhaps even shading into amorality, an issue 
discussed by Honig et al. (2014) and the subject of the next section. While an entrepreneurial 
risk-return perspective in itself may not necessarily lead to misconduct, one may hypothesize 
that, from the rational choice perspective, the stronger the competitive pressures and the 
greater the payoffs, the greater will be the temptation to engage in questionable behaviour or 
misconduct (Shi et al., 2016).11 Consistent with strain theory, some academics desperate for 
tenure approval or promotion may be tempted to engage in misconduct if they risk failing to 
achieve their goals through legitimate means. While awareness of new plagiarism detection 
technologies, high profile retractions (see e.g. Furman et al., 2012), and exposure by social 
media mechanisms may limit more blatant forms of misconduct, more sophisticated metrics-
gaming and the deliberate exploitation of certain ‘grey’ areas of misconduct may emerge in 
their place. 
4. The entrepreneurial risk-return perspective for business school research 
Adopting an entrepreneurial12 risk-return perspective offers interesting insights particularly 
relevant to business schools. Given that analysing risks and returns is a basic prerequisite of 
business, it is little surprise that some business professors might ‘practice what they preach’ 
in terms of identifying and pursuing proxy performance measures likely to result in personal 
and institutional success. Here, we are not criticizing such entrepreneurial efforts by 
individual academics, nor the systems that encourage such behaviour. Instead, our focus is on 
                                                 
8 See http://www.harzing.com/download/jql_journal.pdf (accessed on 13 November 2017) for a comprehensive 
list of journal ranking schemes. 
9 The REF results influenced the distribution of £1.6 billion of research funds for 2016-17 – see 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/media/HEFCE,2014/Content/Pubs/2016/201607/HEFCE2016_07.pdf (accessed on 13 
November 2017). 
10 For a critical analysis of the detrimental effects of an overemphasis on ABS-listed journals, see Mingers and 
Willmott (2013). 
11 See the two case-studies in Annex A, which provide illustrative support for this. 
12 The use here of the term ‘entrepreneurial’ is not to imply that an entrepreneurial risk-return perspective 
invariably results in amoral behaviour. We are merely pointing out that, when competitive and other pressures 
are extreme, those who adopt such an approach may be more inclined to cut corners. 
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how such an orientation may occasionally result in undesirable outcomes, specifically in two 
areas. First, a myopic focus on proxies tends to distance unethical behaviour from direct 
harm, thus incentivizing rule-bending because the risks of direct damage may seem remote. 
Second, there is the indirect but very important impact on business education, where, 
consistent with cultural theories of misconduct, unethical research behaviour tends to erode a 
culture of integrity in the classroom, which in turn may legitimize unethical business 
behaviour in practice (Floyd et al., 2013). As Tang and Liu (2012) show, a supervisor’s 
personal integrity and character have significant effects on business students’ subsequent 
propensity to engage in or refrain from unethical behaviour. 
No harm, no foul: Fraudulent business research might seem to have rather limited impact on 
the subject under investigation, i.e. business. In marked contrast to the medical field, it is rare 
for companies to blame their failure or poor performance on following the advice of a 
fraudulent academic publication. Indeed, much business school research published in elite 
journals has become so narrow, theoretically sophisticated and methodologically complex 
that its direct impact on business practice is limited (Bennis and O’Toole, 2005; Banks et al., 
2016). Falsifying the results for a new pharmaceutical drug could lead to deaths, whereas 
falsifying data for a business journal publication is unlikely to directly affect specific 
businesses, because managers (including those seconded to MBA classes) are unlikely to read 
– let alone fully comprehend – papers published in elite journals. The risks of fraudulent 
business school research may therefore be downplayed by some in terms of the mantra ‘no 
harm, no foul’. This problem thus combines issues of complexity with the rational choice 
perspective, in which the potential damage of misconduct may be perceived as minor by the 
perpetrator when compared to the potential gains. 
Do as I say, not as I do: The larger problem, however, involves the ethical culture that 
business schools develop and promulgate. Floyd et al.’s (2013, p.753) literature review 
concluded that the “reputation of business has been besmirched with a continuous parade of 
financial scandals” with widespread economic repercussions. According to Cavanagh (2009, 
p.20), the leaders responsible for these scandals “are graduates of our ‘best’ business 
programs”, which have “failed to convey ethics, social responsibility, and good moral habits 
to their graduates”.13 In response, Floyd et al. (2013) call for a greater emphasis on ethical 
priorities within business schools. Cabral-Cardoso (2004, p.87) similarly stresses the 
importance of ethics as part of an institution’s core values, but poses the question: “How can 
ethics instruction be taken seriously when expediency and self-interest appear to overrule 
ethical considerations among faculty?” 
                                                 
13 For discussion of the role of business schools and their teaching in corporate scandals and the 2007 financial 
crisis, see Swanson and Frederick (2003), Ghoshal (2005), Pfeffer (2005), and Giacalone and Wargo (2009). 
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Although the risks of getting caught while engaging in blatant misconduct are growing with 
new plagiarism detection technologies (Lee, 2011) and with grass-roots initiatives like 
PubPeer and Retraction Watch, there are, as we discuss below, numerous ‘grey areas’ 
involving questionable research practices that remain problematic. Yet there is limited 
discussion in the literature as to what research behaviour is specifically deemed questionable 
or inappropriate. In what follows, we attempt to fill this gap by developing a taxonomy of 
different forms and levels of research misconduct and other questionable behaviour. This 
includes examining the sources of these different forms of misconduct as seen from the 
rational choice, strain, cultural and network theories of organizational misconduct, as well as 
the more specific entrepreneurial risk-return perspective reflected in much business school 
research. We discuss the paradoxical impact of over-simplistic research proxies and bounded 
rationality, where expectations of increasingly complicated methodological approaches, 
greater emphasis on collaborations with specialized expertise, and demands for more outputs 
in a narrow range of elite journals are all playing a role in shaping research behaviour. To 
complete the taxonomy, we draw on the ‘no harm, no foul’ and ‘do as I say, not as I do’ 
discussion above to consider the degree of misconduct and to examine who is affected. 
5. Towards a taxonomy of research misconduct 
Blatant research misconduct is often contrasted with appropriate conduct – i.e. good scientific 
practice. There is not, however, a simple dichotomy but rather a continuum of behaviour that 
also includes ‘questionable’ and ‘inappropriate’ conduct. Blatant research misconduct is 
clearly defined, with universally accepted rules covering plagiarism and data falsification and 
fabrication in particular. The US Federal Policy on Research Misconduct defines plagiarism 
as “The appropriation of another person’s ideas, processes, results, or words without giving 
appropriate credit”. Data fabrication is “Making up data or results and recording or reporting 
them”, while data falsification is defined as “Manipulating research materials, equipment, or 
processes, or changing or omitting data or results such that the research is not accurately 
represented in the research record”.14 Anderson et al. (2013) note that the US government 
limits legal jurisdiction to blatant misconduct, leaving other questionable practices largely 
unregulated. 
‘Inappropriate’ research conduct is where certain rules exist, although they may vary across 
countries, disciplines, institutions and journals (see Resnik et al., 2015 for an analysis of the 
variations in misconduct definitions and policies). In contrast, ‘questionable’ research 
                                                 
14 See http://grants.nih.gov/grants/research_integrity/research_misconduct.htm (accessed on 13 November 
2017). See also Anderson et al. (2013) for a an extensive review of the literature on research misconduct in the 
US, including definitions, prominent cases, evidence on prevalence, factors encouraging misconduct, and how 
best to deal with the problems. 
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conduct15 is where there is an absence of clear and explicit rules. However, one test here is 
that of ‘the reasonable reader’16 – i.e. what would s/he see as acceptable or unacceptable? 
Another test is whether the individual engaged in the questionable behaviour would resist 
public exposure17 or attempt to cover up their actions. A third test concerns intent, and 
whether the perpetrators believed they would receive some benefit from the questionable 
behaviour. Table 1 below sets out illustrative examples of blatant misconduct, inappropriate, 
questionable and appropriate conduct. 
                                                 
15 One could further separate ‘dubious conduct’ from ‘questionable conduct’, with the former being defined as 
research conduct that most ‘reasonable readers’ would regard as inadequate or unsuitable, while for 
‘questionable conduct’ opinions are more evenly divided between those who regard the conduct as acceptable 
and those who do not. However, it is probably better to keep the taxonomy relatively simple at this stage. 
16 The notion of the ‘reasonable reader’ is well established in the legal sphere, in particular with regard to law on 
libel. According to ‘the innocent-construction rule’, US courts must interpret the words “as they appeared to 
have been used and according to the idea they intended to convey to the reasonable reader” (see 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/i/innocent-construction-rule/ - accessed on 13 November 2017). See also 
McCraw (1991). 
17 “Would such behavior pass the New York Times front page test (i.e., how would the author feel if the New 
York Times did a front page exposé of such academic practices)?” (Anon, 2015, p.216) 
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Table 1. A Taxonomy of Research Misconduct, Inappropriate and Questionable Conduct 
N
a
tu
re
 o
f 
b
eh
a
v
io
u
r
  
Appropriate conduct Questionable conduct Inappropriate conduct Blatant misconduct 
Widely accepted as good 
scientific practice 
Absence of clear rules but test of ‘the 
reasonable reader’; perpetrator 
embarrassed/ reluctant to be revealed 
Rules exist although there may be some 
variation by field, country, institution 
and/or journal) 
Clearly defined and universally 
accepted rules  
D
at
a 
m
an
i-
p
u
la
ti
o
n
  Winsorization*  HARKing  Selective reporting 
 Omitted data 
 Data fabrication (e.g. Stapel, 
Hunton) 
 Data falsification (e.g. 
Lichtenthaler, Smeesters) 
U
se
 o
f 
w
o
rk
  
b
y
 o
th
er
s 
 Drawing from and building 
on work of others 
 Short phrases lifted from others 
and not put in quotation marks 
 Entire sentences reproduced without 
source or quotation marks 
 Failure to cite or acknowledge 
others 
 Plagiarism of entire article, whole 
section(s) etc. (e.g. Gottinger, 
Antoniou) 
 Wilfully omitting an entire body 
of work (e.g. in a proposal) 
U
se
 o
f 
o
w
n
 w
o
rk
 
 Making every effort to 
diffuse one’s work 
 Avoiding excessive self-
citation 
 Maximizing one’s research 
output 
 Hyping own work/excessive self-
citation 
 Partial overlap with other papers by 
that author 
 Salami publishing 
 Self-plagiarism (e.g. Frey, 
Lichtenthaler) 
 Redundant publication 
 Using the same theory or data to 
arrive at different conclusions 
(just for the sake of publishing 
another paper) 
A
u
th
o
r-
sh
ip
  Including as authors all who 
have made a substantial 
contribution 
 Obligatory authorship (e.g. 
expectation that a PhD supervisor 
should be an author) 
 Ghost authorship (e.g. Song) 
 Gift authorship 
 Gift colluding 
 Failure to declare an interest (e.g. 
Yang & Tao) 
Source: An extensive review of the literature along with the authors’ own experiences as journal editors. 
Note: The above categories are not exhaustive; there are many other forms of misconduct (e.g. fake referees, citation cartels, journal impact factor (JIF) manipulation by 
editors) and the examples listed here are merely illustrative of the spectrum. Note also that some of the above examples may not fall neatly into a single ‘box’ but extend over 
two or more degrees of severity (e.g. use of a ghost author to improve the written English may not be considered as ‘inappropriate’ or even ‘questionable’). 
* Winsorization is the assigning of lesser weight to an apparently spurious outlier or modifying its value so it is closer to other sample values (Dixon and Tukey, 1968; Ghosh 
and Vogt, 2012).
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Matters are complicated by the fact that for certain offences (e.g. data falsification and 
plagiarism) the degree of severity can vary. Data fabrication is an exception – it is essentially 
binary in that either the data have been produced from the empirical study reported or they 
have been fabricated. One prominent example involves Diederik Stapel, the social 
psychologist18 who fabricated data in several dozen studies (Tilburg University, 2012); by 
2016, over 50 of his papers had been retracted (in some cases for data falsification rather than 
fabrication). Another is the accountancy professor, James Hunton, who fabricated data in 
several articles (Bentley University, 2015) and has now had over 30 publications retracted. 
Data falsification represents a clear case of ‘blatant misconduct’. In the case of Dirk 
Smeesters, professor of consumer behaviour at Rotterdam School of Management, four 
papers were found to have “severe problems” with data manipulation (Erasmus University, 
2014) and his employment was terminated. Similarly, several papers by Ulrich Lichtenthaler 
were discovered to have problems relating to the misrepresentation of the degree of statistical 
significance and/or deliberate ‘omitted variable bias’. His Habilitation was revoked19 and he 
had to resign from his Chair of Management and Organisation at Mannheim University in 
2015.20 However, data falsification can take less severe forms including selective reporting 
and omitted data, and as such may be regarded as ‘inappropriate’. Although there are rules 
regarding such practices, they are sometimes ‘fuzzy’ in that there is no clear boundary (for 
instance, how many data outliers can be dropped before this becomes ‘inappropriate’ or 
blatant?).  
Another form of questionable data manipulation is HARKing or Hypothesizing After the 
Results are Known (Kerr, 1998) – i.e. retrofitting hypotheses to one’s data in order to achieve 
high(er) statistical significance (Martin, 2016). Such a practice may be encouraged by 
referees trying the help authors improve the statistical significance of their findings (Anon, 
2015), but it is generally considered ‘unscientific’.21 On the other hand, many would regard 
Winsorization of data – the assigning of lesser weight to an apparently spurious outlier – as 
acceptable (see e.g. Dixon and Tukey, 1968; Ghosh and Vogt, 2012). In short, data 
manipulation ranges from blatant misconduct through inappropriate and questionable conduct 
to broadly acceptable forms of ‘trimming’ or ‘tidying up’ of one’s data. The precise boundary 
regarding what is deemed unacceptable is at best indistinct and at worst a matter of rather 
subjective interpretation. 
                                                 
18 He had been Director of the Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research (TIBER) and later Dean of 
the Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences. 
19 See http://www.rhein-zeitung.de/region_artikel,-whu-erkennt-einstigem-starprofessor-lehrbefaehigung-ab-
_arid,1037700.html (accessed on 15 December 2016). 
20 This case is examined in more detail in Annex A, in particular the role that competitive pressures played. 
21 One exception is when authors are completely open in acknowledging that their hypotheses had been 
modified in the light of emerging results (Anon, 2015, p.216).  
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Plagiarism likewise covers a wide range in terms of seriousness. Plagiarism of an entire paper 
(e.g. by serial plagiarist Hans Werner Gottinger – see Martin, 2007 & 2012) or large sections 
(e.g. by Tony Antoniou, whose Deanship of Durham Business School was terminated when 
substantial parts of his PhD thesis and a journal article were found to have been drawn from 
other sources – see Tahir, 2008) clearly constitutes serious misconduct. Such cases are, 
however, relatively rare. More common is lifting of entire sentences (e.g. in the literature 
review section of a paper) with no use of quotation marks and no indication of the source. 
While one or two cases in a paper might be passed off, most editors will deem repeated 
instances to constitute ‘inappropriate’ research conduct. Another example is where material 
has been taken from a particular source and paraphrased to some extent but the original 
source is not cited at that point in the text. Both examples probably come under the heading 
of ‘questionable’ research conduct – seen as wrong by many22 but not necessarily by 
everyone. Note, however, that editors tend to regard such errors as symptomatic of sloppy 
research and, if detected and widespread, will often lead to desk rejection. 
Besides the direct lifting of text, plagiarism also includes taking ideas or other research 
material from others and failing to acknowledge the source. Often harder to prove, this is 
perhaps best seen as a form of ‘inappropriate’ conduct unless it is widespread and clearly 
deliberate. A less serious form may consist of hyping of one’s own work or excessive self-
citation, where the perpetrator may view this as causing no harm and thus no foul, or even as 
a form of protection against self-plagiarism, even though the outcome is an inflated citation 
score (Seeber et al., 2018). Here, there are often no clear rules so perhaps this is best 
described as ‘questionable’ conduct. 
While plagiarism is a form of intellectual theft, self-plagiarism is a form of intellectual 
deception (ibid.), and can be defined as: 
“the practice by an author (or co-authors) of reproducing text, ideas, 
data, findings or other material from one or more earlier (or 
contemporaneous) papers by the same author(s) without explicitly 
citing or otherwise acknowledging those other papers, thereby 
misleading the reader (and in particular referees and editors) as to the 
level of originality of that paper” (Martin, 2013, p.1008). 
Self-plagiarism includes a range of forms of differing severity. In some cases, essentially the 
same paper is republished in different journals. For example, Bruno Frey (formerly professor 
at University of Zurich) and colleagues published four versions of a study of who survived 
the Titanic disaster, with each paper containing no cross-references to the others. Such 
behaviour is generally seen as ‘inappropriate’. For example, the editor of one of the affected 
journals publically stated that he found such conduct “ethically dubious” (Autor, 2011, 
                                                 
22 See, for example, the excellent online tutorials on plagiarism on the Indiana University website at 
https://www.indiana.edu/~plag/examples.html (accessed on 13 November 2017). 
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p.239). An investigation at Frey’s university concluded that “repeated failure to publish the 
same work without consent of the editors and without cross-references (‘Eigenplagate’)” was 
“improper” (University of Zurich, 2011), and his university contract was not renewed. 
For most journals, authors must attest that submitted papers have not been published nor are 
they under consideration elsewhere. There are thus clear rules, although it is unknown how 
effectively they are monitored. While authors may answer ‘Yes’ to this question, there are 
many cases where there is some overlap between the paper submitted and others already 
published by the author(s) or currently under consideration by other journals. Here, the issue 
centres on the degree of overlap. In the mind of the author, the papers may appear distinct, 
but the ‘reasonable reader’ referred to above may perceive there to be significant overlap that 
affects the level of a paper’s originality, and hence the decision on whether to publish. 
Related to self-plagiarism is redundant or duplicate publication23. This can be defined as “a 
paper where the existence of one or more prior (or contemporaneous) papers by the same 
author(s) means that the new paper offers insufficient of an original contribution to 
knowledge to merit publication in its own right” (Martin, 2013, p.1008). In the pre-digital age 
(where researchers could scan only a limited set of journals), duplicate publication may have 
been regarded as acceptable if each version of the paper was addressing a different 
readership. However, with digital search engines enabling a paper on a given topic to be 
quickly found wherever it is published, such behaviour is generally now deemed 
inappropriate24 unless explicit editorial approval has been obtained. If found out, a duplicate 
or redundant paper may be retracted by the journal involved. 
Also closely related is the phenomenon of salami publishing, defined as: 
the deliberate attempt by an author or team of authors to 
inappropriately inflate the total of publications yielded by a particular 
research study (or database, survey, experiment, project or whatever) 
through a process of subdividing the published output into a number of 
thin ‘slices’ or ‘least publishable units’, thereby either generating a 
greater number of separate publications than is merited by the overall 
contribution to knowledge offered by that study, or creating a situation 
where the research community would instead be better served by the 
results being combined in a single or a smaller number of publications. 
(Martin, 2013, p.1008) 
Salami publishing is becoming more common due to growing competitive pressure on 
researchers and funding agencies expecting value for money in the form of publications. 
                                                 
23 Redundant or duplicate publication may or may not involve self-plagiarism, depending on whether the author 
cites or otherwise discloses the existence of the other paper. 
24 For example, it might sometimes be deemed acceptable for a second version to be published in a practitioner 
journal with a very different readership, or a foreign language journal, but explicit permission from the editors 
involved and cross-referencing would still be required. 
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Currently there are no clear rules about how many papers one can legitimately obtain from a 
given study (something that clearly depends on the scale of the project). Less scrupulous 
authors or those under intense competitive pressures may try to exploit that ambiguity. For 
example, Lichtenthaler produced over 20 articles from his PhD study (see Annex A). 
Gift authorship, a form of network misconduct, is where researchers are included as co-
authors despite not having “participated sufficiently in the work to take public responsibility 
for the content” (Vancouver Group, 1985, p.722). This can include adding senior or 
prestigious authors to improve the appeal of the paper or out of a sense of obligation or 
pressure from senior colleagues. Junior authors may be included in papers to help their tenure 
file or enhance their employment prospects. Some authors may ‘gift collude’ – where one 
author puts the name of another on one paper and in return has his/her name included on 
another. Most journals have rules against such practices so this constitutes ‘inappropriate’ 
behaviour. However, it is almost impossible to detect, and often only becomes an issue when 
the integrity of a paper is challenged and one of the authors claims they were unaware of 
what went wrong (Smith, 1994). 
The converse of gift authorship is ghost authorship, where an actual author is not named (e.g. 
for commercial or conflict-of-interest reasons), a practice considered ‘inappropriate’ and 
proscribed by most journals.25 An example involves Michael Song, who, according to a 
subsequent investigation (UMKC, p.14), admitted that he may have written parts of the Yang 
and Tao (2011) paper described in Annex A, which claimed that Song was the world’s top 
innovation management scholar! 
The last category discussed here is failure to declare an interest in a publication. A history of 
authors failing to declare a material interest with the result that dubious research went 
unnoticed (at least initially) has resulted in fairly universal rules among journals requiring the 
declaration of any relevant professional, institutional, commercial or other material interest. 
Again, there are grey areas  – i.e. when is an interest significant enough to declare and when 
not? This ambiguity has been exploited by some who think that not declaring an interest may 
increase the likelihood of publication. For example, Yang and Tao’s (2011) paper on the best 
innovation management researchers and departments failed to declare the pertinent fact that 
the authors had been visiting researchers at what the paper claimed was the top department in 
the field. Furthermore, it conspicuously failed to mention that the individual named as top 
researcher in the field (Song) had actually drafted parts of the paper (UMKC, 2015, p.14). If 
in any doubt, the author should simply declare that interest to the editor and let the latter 
decide if it should be made public. 
                                                 
25 For a legal approach to the problem of ghost authorship, see Stern and Lemmens (2011). 
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So far we have summarized various forms of questionable or inappropriate conduct and 
blatant research misconduct. Although there are relatively clear rules for what is regarded as 
appropriate and for what constitutes blatant misconduct, there is considerable ambiguity in 
between these two extremes. We have argued that questionable conduct can be distinguished 
from inappropriate conduct by the degree to which there are rules precluding that specific 
form of conduct. However, an effective taxonomy ideally requires a sharper set of 
distinctions. To achieve this, we next analyse the sources of research misconduct to help us 
understand the pressures and thus the underlying intent and severity of the behaviour. We 
then discuss the degree to which the behaviour affects various stakeholders, providing a 
further means to distinguish between questionable and inappropriate conduct. 
6. Sources of research misconduct 
Section 2 outlined various theoretically derived sources of organizational misconduct. Table 
2 presents a taxonomy of the various types and examples of research misconduct, the 
theoretical foundations on which they are based, the severity of the misbehaviour involved 
and relevant corrective measures. While we would contend that competitive pressures and 
incentives are an ultimate cause of growing misconduct26, this table sets out different types of 
‘proximate’ causes commonly identified during misconduct investigations. 
                                                 
26 We do not explore here the impact of technology on research misconduct, as our primary focus is why, rather 
than how, research misconduct may occur. In the case of plagiarism, the growing availability of academic 
material online has facilitated and even encouraged ‘cutting and pasting’, and a tendency among some to then 
‘forget’ to paraphrase or cite the lifted material. 
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Table 2. A Taxonomy of the Sources of Research Misconduct and Other Questionable 
Behaviour 
Type Examples of Behaviour Theoretical Sources of Misconduct 
(Greve et al., 2010, plus others as shown) 
Severity & 
Sample 
Corrective 
Measures 
P
re
m
ed
it
at
ed
 d
is
h
o
n
es
ty
 - Fully aware of rules but intent on 
breaking because risk-reward not 
aligned 
- Belief that getting caught is 
unlikely 
Rational choice (e.g. Arrow, 1963) 
Cost-benefit analysis (Becker, 1968; Hornuf 
and Haas, 2014) 
Very high 
Loss of research 
funding, 
employment 
termination, 
criminal charges - Desperate to get published for fear 
of losing career 
Strain theory (Agnew, 1992; Lewellyn et 
al., 2017; Merton, 1938) 
- Others have got away with it, so 
belief that this is the only way 
ahead 
Cultural theories (Stein, 1983 & 1985; 
Monteduro et al., 2016; Sims and 
Brinkmann, 2003) 
B
en
d
in
g
 o
r 
g
am
in
g
 t
h
e 
ru
le
s 
- Aware of rules but attempt to shift 
boundary between appropriate and 
inappropriate conduct, exploiting 
unclear or inconsistent rules for 
personal gain 
- Belief that “anything goes” and “all 
that is not forbidden is allowed”, 
often with specious post hoc 
justification (e.g. “I was told not to 
self-cite”) but with evidence of 
premeditation and/or covering of 
tracks 
Rational Choice (Arrow, 1963) 
Entrepreneurial risk-return perspective 
(Honig et al., 2014) 
Cultural theories (Stein, 1983 & 1985; 
Monteduro et al., 2016; Sims and 
Brinkmann, 2003) 
High 
Public exposure, 
retraction of 
papers, formal 
warning 
C
o
m
p
le
x
it
y
 a
n
d
 
am
b
ig
u
it
y
 
 
- Unclear or different rules, editorial 
policies, conventions, etc. 
- General awareness of rules but 
open to interpretation (ambiguity) 
Bounded rationality (March and Simon, 
1958; Simon, 1969; Vaughan, 1999) 
Ambiguity (Fanelli, 2009, John et al., 2012; 
Johnson and Ecklund, 2016). 
Medium, but 
potentially more 
serious if signs of 
premeditation or 
cover-up 
Improved 
awareness, COPE 
guidelines, clearer 
expectations of 
responsibilities of 
co-authors 
- Many co-authors, all of whom 
assume someone else makes final 
check 
- Individual co-authors submit 
slightly different versions to 
different journals  
Bounded rationality (March and Simon, 
1958; Simon, 1969; Vaughan, 1999) 
Network theories (Ashforth et al., 2008; 
Breit and Forsberg, 2016) 
Ig
n
o
ra
n
ce
 a
n
d
 
sl
o
p
p
in
es
s 
 
- Researchers from different 
‘cultures’ where norms/ 
conventions different  
Cultural theories (Stein, 1983 & 1985; 
Monteduro et al., 2016; Sims and 
Brinkmann, 2003; Umphress et al., 2010). 
- Lack of experience, research 
capabilities (e.g. PhD students, 
junior researchers) 
- May have intended to sort out 
problem but ‘never got round to it’ 
Bounded rationality (Simon, 1969; March 
and Simon, 1958; Johnson and Ecklund, 
2016) 
H
o
n
es
t 
m
is
ta
k
e - Often claimed, but less credible for 
established researchers, and only 
valid if not systematic or part of a 
pattern 
Accidental misconduct (Vaughan, 1999). Low 
Better training 
and supervision 
Premeditated dishonesty, the most serious type of misconduct, is where the perpetrator is 
aware of the rules and hides the misconduct in the hope of getting away with it. From the 
perspective of rational choice theory (e.g. Arrow, 1963; Greve et al, 2010) or cost-benefit 
analysis (Becker, 1968; Hornuf and Haas, 2014), the culprit has implicitly if not explicitly 
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weighed up the balance between the benefits of the misconduct (e.g. another publication) 
against the risk of being caught and the sanctions that may follow. According to strain theory 
(Greve, 2010; Merton, 1938), the behaviour might be attributed to stressful circumstances 
(Lewellyn et al., 2017) or shear desperation, such as fears over tenure, employability or 
meeting grant obligations. It may also be justified through cultural theory (Greve, 2010; 
Stein, 1985), for example, where the culprit believes that social norms (Monteduro et al. 
2016) or deep cultural flaws (Sims and Brinkmann, 2003) encourage systemic corruption and 
the only way to succeed is through misconduct. Often the misconduct is accompanied by 
evidence of intent, such as covering one’s tracks. An example is the Gottinger case of serial 
plagiarism mentioned earlier, where the beginning and end of a plagiarized paper would be 
altered in an attempt to hide the fact that the main body of the paper was plagiarized. The 
range of sanctions involved in such cases include revocation of research funding, being 
banned from the affected journals, loss of one’s job and perhaps even criminal proceedings. 
The second type of misconduct consists of bending the rules, i.e. the individual is aware of 
the rules but is unilaterally trying to shift the boundary between appropriate and inappropriate 
conduct in their favour, often exploiting unclear or inconsistent rules. Like premeditated 
dishonesty, there may be elements of rational choice, cost-benefit and strain theories, 
although the underlying logic is an extreme version of the entrepreneurial risk-return 
perspective (Honig et al., 2014), whereby culprits often justify their actions by seeing unclear 
or inconsistent rules as opportunities to exploit for personal gain. When challenged, the 
individual frequently offers specious reasons for their behaviour (for instance, if challenged 
about self-plagiarism, they may claim “My supervisor told me not to cite my own work”). 
Such culprits tend to have a very restricted and self-serving sense of morality, best summed 
up in the phrase “All that is not forbidden is allowed”. As discussed above, such amoral 
attitudes towards ethical behaviour in business schools have been partly responsible for a 
culture that may have facilitated many of the financial scandals in recent years (Cabral-
Cardoso, 2004; Cavanagh, 2009; Floyd et al., 2013). Corrective measures include rejection or 
retraction of papers and the issuing of formal warnings, as well as punitive measures such as 
public exposure and, depending on the severity and persistence of the behaviour, termination 
of employment. 
The next two types of behaviour are less serious, though still unacceptable. The first includes 
complexity, a situation where many interacting variables result in bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1969) making mistakes likely (Vaughan, 1999), and ambiguity, where rules may be 
open to interpretation (Fanelli, 2009, John et al., 2012; Johnson and Ecklund, 2016). 
Examples include unclear or inconsistent rules, conventions or editorial policies. Another 
example might be a paper with numerous co-authors where nobody made a final check, or 
where one co-author submitted one version of a paper to one journal and another to a second 
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journal without checking with each other.27 However, if there are any signs of premeditation, 
this puts the case in a more serious category. Although complexity can be a legitimate cause 
of mistakes (discussed below), it is often used in an attempt to retrospectively justify 
questionable behaviour. 
Note that complexity is likely to increase over time, given that elite journals expect ever more 
sophisticated methodologies and theoretical contributions, while funding agencies may call 
for greater interdisciplinary collaborations among stakeholders with specialized expertise 
(Hall et al., 2014) along with demands for more outputs. Breit and Forsberg (2016) suggest 
that such increased pressures for greater network collaboration can contribute towards 
research misconduct because inter alia collaborators may provide information of dubious 
practices, such as how to get away with things in order to meet performance targets. Among 
the corrective measures are clearer rules and guidelines, improved awareness, greater use of 
COPE guidelines28, and clearer expectations with regard to co-authors’ responsibilities. 
Ignorance and sloppiness may occur when the perpetrator is broadly aware of the rules but 
perhaps rather ‘hazy’ on exact details. For example, the perpetrator may have been aware of a 
problem (e.g. a failure to paraphrase material taken from other sources) and intended to 
resolve the problem later but failed to do so. Failure to properly check the rules or simple 
incompetence may be the cause, especially for early-career researchers and PhD students (i.e. 
bounded rationality). Researchers from less scientifically developed countries may also lack 
adequate training or claim cultural differences regarding research norms and conventions. 
The defence of ignorance is frequently invoked but is not always credible, the problem 
instead often being more due to sloppiness or to naivety regarding the editorial process. 
Moreover, as in other areas of life, “Ignorance of the law is no excuse”. Note that if the 
publication reveals signs of premeditation or attempts by the author(s) to cover their tracks, 
claims of ignorance or sloppiness are invalid, placing the case in a more serious category. 
The corrective measures for such cases are broadly similar to those for the previous category, 
but with particular emphasis on better training and increased awareness. 
The least serious type of behaviour involves honest errors or genuine mistakes, which, while 
not true forms of misconduct or inappropriate behaviour, are nevertheless problematic. The 
key issue is how the issue is addressed once identified. Such cases can only be a one-off – if 
repeated or part of a pattern, then this is not a credible defence, and there must also be no 
evidence of premeditation or attempted cover-up, otherwise it belongs in a more serious 
category. Honest mistakes are often claimed but are a less credible defence for established 
                                                 
27 Another example of complexity is ‘Climategate’, where the researchers, in attempting to deal with a wide 
array of stakeholders with very different agendas, ended up resorting to somewhat dubious research practices 
(Garud et al., 2014). 
28 See https://publicationethics.org/ (accessed on 13 November 2017). 
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researchers.  They may, however, be common among scholars under pressure to juggle 
numerous projects, teaching and administrative tasks, i.e. a complexity issue (Vaughan, 
1999).  
Consistent with our distinction between inappropriate and questionable research conduct, the 
severity of the case (and the ensuing sanction) is greater when: (i) there is evidence of 
attempts by the perpetrator to hide the mistake; (ii) a repeat offender is involved; (iii) the 
offender is a more experienced researcher in an institution or country where the rules are 
clear and the action would thus be seen as unacceptable to the reasonable reader; and (iv) the 
offender would receive some undue benefit from the ‘mistake’. The main approach to dealing 
with honest errors or genuine mistakes consists of better training and supervision of younger 
researchers and others who have erred. 
Having outlined the various forms of research conduct, and the sources from which they are 
derived, we now turn to the final component of our taxonomy, the degree to which the 
behaviour affects different stakeholders. 
7. Who is affected by research misconduct, and by how much? 
Misconduct, inappropriate and questionable conduct can have an impact on a range of 
stakeholders. Table 3 below sets out a typology of the main stakeholders affected and 
indicates, for illustrative purposes, the severity of the impact on each. Most directly, 
misconduct may have consequences for other researchers. Those who build on research 
subsequently found to be tainted lose credibility. Victims of plagiarism often feel a strong 
sense of violation, and may subsequently suffer where, for example, citations are effectively 
‘stolen’ from them, reducing their standing within the academic community and hindering 
promotion opportunities. Other forms of misconduct with serious consequences include 
failure to declare an interest and ghost authorship, both of which may result in biased or 
unreliable results being given undue credibility, potentially misleading those who later draw 
upon that work.29 Likewise, undue weight may be given to a paper’s results in the case of gift 
authorship involving a high-status researcher.
                                                 
29 In medical research, the consequences of ghost authorship can be far more severe, for example, influencing 
regulators to approve a drug. 
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Table 3. Stakeholders affected by research misconduct 
Type of behaviour Other researchers Employers Students Editors/journals Societal stakeholders 
B
la
ta
n
t 
M
is
co
n
d
u
ct
 Data fabrication 
Authors who build on 
tainted work lose 
credibility 
Perpetrator’s inflated 
publication record  
others lose out 
Damage to reputation of 
institution 
May lead some to feel 
rewards of cheating 
greater than risks & 
costs of getting caught 
Serious damage to 
journal’s reputation 
Major effort needed 
to investigate 
Erroneous 
implications for 
practice Data falsification 
Plagiarism 
Authors whose work 
stolen lose status etc. 
Possible effect on 
meta-reviews 
Failure to declare an 
interest 
Biased/ unreliable results 
– misleads others 
Damage to reputation of 
institution 
Legitimizes unethical 
behaviour 
Erroneous impli-
cations for practice 
In
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e 
co
n
d
u
ct
 
Selective reporting, 
omitted data 
Unreliable results – 
misleads others 
Perpetrator’s inflated 
publication record  
others lose out 
Salary, promotion costs 
based on dubious 
productivity 
Damage to reputation of 
institution 
May lead some to feel 
that can ‘bend’ the 
rules or belief that ‘all 
that is not forbidden is 
allowed’ 
Major effort needed 
to investigate/police 
Repeated infringe-
ments  damage to 
journal’s reputation 
Erroneous implications 
for practice 
Sentences lifted 
without attribution Those plagiarized lose 
potential citations + status 
Possible effect on 
meta-reviews 
Failure to cite or 
acknowledge others 
Self-plagiarism Takes publication slots 
away from legitimate 
research Redundant publication 
Gift authorship 
If high status co-author, 
undue credibility given to 
results 
If high status co-
author, undue weight 
given to results 
Ghost authorship Misleads others Reputational damage Erroneous implications 
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HARKing 
Undue weight given to 
results/author ( others 
lose out) 
Perpetrator’s inflated 
publication record  
others lose out 
Damage to reputation of 
institution 
May lead some to feel 
that can ‘bend’ the 
rules or belief that ‘all 
that is not forbidden is 
allowed’ 
Major effort needed 
to investigate/police 
Repeated infringe-
ments may  
damage to reputation 
of journal 
May  erroneous 
implications for 
practice 
Short phrases lifted & 
not put in quotes 
Those plagiarized lose 
potential citations + status 
Possible effect on 
meta-reviews – may  
erroneous implications 
for practice 
Hyping own work/ 
excessive self-citation 
Annoyance with author – 
weakens reputation 
Partial overlap with 
other papers by author 
Salami publishing 
Code: Effect on others shown in bold – Severe Impact;  
Effect on others shown in italics – Significant Impact;  
Effect on others shown in normal typeface – Minor Impact 
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For self-plagiarism, the direct consequences are felt mainly by the perpetrator, who may lose 
peer status and perhaps even their job if discovered (for example, Frey’s contract was not 
renewed by Zurich University). Similarly, the effects of redundant publication and salami 
publishing are directly felt mainly by the perpetrator in the form of diminished reputation, 
although other researchers may spend unnecessary time ploughing through additional papers 
that make little or no additional contribution. However, as discussed below, there are 
important indirect effects, such as perpetrators being hired or promoted over others who do 
not engage in such behaviour. Furthermore, senior scholars often set the cultural norms 
within their communities, which may encourage others to cut corners. In the case of 
HARKing, the consequence is that other researchers may give undue weight to the results or 
to the author, with others hence losing out in terms of the attention and status accorded. It 
may also raise expectations for future research, artificially increasing the bar for publication. 
A second stakeholder category consists of employers. Perpetrators of misconduct may have 
been rewarded with promotion or increased salaries for an inflated publication score at the 
expense of others in the organization. In addition, there will almost certainly be some damage 
to the organization’s reputation depending on the severity of the misconduct. However, in 
some cases, a business school may benefit (at least in the short run) through enhanced 
funding or renewed accreditation. Indeed, some individuals may even attempt to justify their 
misconduct in terms of helping their organisation, i.e. what Umphress et al. (2010) term 
‘unethical pro-organizational behaviour’. 
The third category of those affected by misconduct consists of students. If they become aware 
that their lecturers are engaging in and being rewarded for misconduct, some may sense that 
the rewards for cheating are greater than the risks of getting caught, or that they, too, are 
entitled to ‘bend’ the rules. As various studies have suggested, this tendency may be 
particularly pronounced among economics and business school students (e.g. Frank et al., 
1996; Klein et al., 2006; McCabe et al., 2006; Giacolone and Thompson, 2006; Giacolone 
and Wargo, 2009; Brown, 2011; Wang et al., 2011). 
A fourth category of stakeholders comprises journal editors. Serious forms of misconduct 
require considerable resources to investigate the allegations. This includes putting together a 
case, seeking a response from the defendant(s), considering that response, determining the 
outcome and, where the misconduct is proven, deciding an appropriate sanction. This 
generally involves following a formal procedure as set out by COPE. Such cases typically 
take several person-months of effort, time that could be better spent on other editorial tasks. 
Moreover, when misconduct has been detected, their journal’s reputation can suffer since 
their editing and review procedures may be blamed for not detecting the problem sooner. 
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The last category consists of societal stakeholders such as firms, government departments and 
NGOs that utilize the research. Here, forms of misconduct such as data fabrication and 
falsification, failure to declare an interest, ghost authorship and HARKing can all result in 
erroneous practical implications for management or policy. In the case of gift authorship 
involving a high-status individual, the possible consequence is undue weight being accorded 
to the results. However, for plagiarism, self-plagiarism, redundant publication and salami 
publishing, the consequences for external stakeholders are generally less pronounced, except 
where meta-reviews are involved, in which case the findings of the undetected plagiarist or 
self-plagiarist may be given undue weight. 
This section completes our taxonomy of research misconduct and other forms of dubious 
behaviour. By distinguishing between the different types of stakeholders affected by 
misconduct, we can obtain a clearer view as to who is most seriously affected and to what 
extent. The results provide further grounds for classifying particular forms of behaviour in the 
different categories of blatant misconduct (where the impact on others is most severe), 
inappropriate conduct (where the impact on others is generally not as severe but is 
nevertheless significant) and questionable conduct (where the impact on others is relatively 
minor or less direct). In the final section, we synthesize the main conclusions emerging from 
the literature review and from our efforts to develop a useful taxonomy of research 
misconduct. 
8. Discussion and Conclusions 
Growing publishing pressures in academia for improved individual and institutional success 
appear to have created perverse incentives (Bouter, 2015), encouraging gaming of the system 
and pushing the boundaries of appropriate research behaviour (Martin, 2016). While 
examples of blatant misconduct are relatively easy to identify, they are only part of a far 
wider problem of inappropriate research behaviour (Butler el al., 2017), much of which 
remains poorly understood (Fanelli, 2009; John et al., 2012) and is often open to ambiguous 
interpretation (Johnson and Ecklund, 2016). To address this ambiguity, we have developed a 
taxonomy that differentiates various forms of research behaviour, ranging from appropriate 
practice to blatant misconduct, and specifically focusing on behaviour between these 
extremes. Our aim is to provide clearer, more consistent guidelines for researchers, especially 
those beginning their careers, in an attempt to reduce ambiguity and hence reverse the trend 
towards dubious research behaviour apparent in many fields (Fanelli, 2009; van Noorden, 
2011). 
Following Anderson et al.’s (2013) call for research on actual research behaviour rather than 
hypothetical situations, we cite real examples from business school research, where 
competitive pressures and incentives to engage in misconduct seem particularly acute (Honig 
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and Bedi, 2012). At the same time, increasingly sophisticated theoretical and methodical 
approaches may have distanced much business school research from practice (Bennis and 
O’Toole, 2005; Banks et al., 2016), encouraging a ‘no harm, no foul’ justification for dubious 
behaviour. We attempted to refute this excuse by identifying the stakeholders affected by 
such behaviour, as well as the pernicious influence it may have on promulgating unethical 
decision-making in the wider business community (Floyd et al., 2013). If faculty are 
perceived to be engaged in gaming the system or other dubious conduct, such an amoral 
culture is likely to be reproduced among graduates, affecting their future behaviour and the 
organizations in which they work. 
Several authors have distinguished appropriate research behaviour from blatant misconduct, 
while recognizing there is a range of behaviours in between. Building on this, we developed a 
taxonomy that includes the nature and severity of different forms of research misconduct, its 
sources and the stakeholders it affects. We have shown how one can combine several bodies 
of theoretical work, including rational choice, strain, cultural, network, and bounded 
rationality theories of misconduct. By doing so, we have presented one of the first attempts to 
construct a more formal and theoretically based taxonomy30 that can help deal with the 
growing problem of research misconduct. In particular, it may be useful for training PhD 
students and young researchers, providing clarity regarding the boundary between what is 
acceptable and what is not, and encourage scholars to think about the propriety and ethics of 
their behaviour rather than just relying on ‘the rules’. It may also be useful for researchers 
when reflecting on their research and publication strategies, especially when confronted with 
pressures to increase their output and maximise their ‘score’ on some particular metric. In 
addition, the typology may be useful for editors and others responsible for ensuring research 
integrity and determining where authors have strayed across the boundary between what is 
acceptable and what is not, whether intentionally or otherwise. 
From the taxonomy and the theoretical perspectives on which it is based, we present in Table 
4 a number of testable propositions that might be the subject of future empirical work on 
research misconduct. (Note that these are merely illustrative rather than intending to offer a 
comprehensive list.) 
 
                                                 
30 The only other taxonomy we have come across is that developed by Helton-Fauth et al. (2013) but this is 
rather different in nature, providing a taxonomy of ‘ethical events’ in research, with the four main categories 
relating to ‘data’, ‘study conduct’, ‘professional practices’ and ‘business practices’. 
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Table 4. Some testable propositions 
Theoretical 
approach 
Proposition 
Rational 
choice 
theory 
 The greater the rewards and pressures for high performance in academic organizations, 
the more prevalent research misconduct tends to be. 
 When penalties for misconduct are seen as minor or trivial, the more prevalent research 
misconduct tends to be. 
 The lower the probability that misconduct cases are followed up and investigated, the 
more prevalent research misconduct tends to be. 
 When rules on misconduct are lacking or unclear, the more prevalent research misconduct 
tends to be. 
 When the direct impact of misconduct is seen as trivial (i.e. ‘no harm, no foul’), the more 
prevalent research misconduct tends to be. 
Strain theory  The greater the pressures on individual academics in an organization to perform, the more 
they come to see research misconduct as justified and the more prevalent it tends to be. 
 The more intense the competitive pressures on academic organizations, the more prevalent 
research misconduct tends to be. 
Cultural 
theory 
 The more senior academics (e.g. leading researchers, journal editors, business school 
deans) are seen to be engaged in gaming or other dubious practices, the more prevalent 
research misconduct tends to be. 
 The less effort invested by academic organizations in the ethical socialization of their 
staff, the more prevalent research misconduct tends to be. 
 The laxer the enforcement of ethical policies by academic organizations, the more 
prevalent research misconduct tends to be. 
 The laxer the enforcement of ethical policies by journal editors, the more prevalent 
research misconduct tends to be. 
 The more a national or disciplinary culture adheres to a belief that ‘all that is not 
forbidden is allowed’, the more prevalent research misconduct tends to be. 
Network 
theory 
 The more organizations are involved in a research collaboration with different 
performance expectations, the more prevalent research misconduct tends to be. 
 The more internally well connected but globally isolated a part of a research network, the 
more prevalent research misconduct tends to be. 
Complexity 
and bounded 
rationality 
 Research that involves complicated methodologies is more likely to involve misconduct 
than in the case of simpler methodologies where it is more difficult to mask. 
 The more a research collaboration requires different specialist expertise, the more difficult 
it is for members to know whether misconduct is present, and thus the more likely it is to 
be prevalent. 
Note: ‘Misconduct’ is used in the above table to include the wider spectrum of dubious and inappropriate 
behaviour as well as more blatant misconduct. 
The rational choice propositions are predicated on situations where the pressures and rewards 
are high, while the misconduct or questionable research behaviour may be rationally (albeit 
not morally) justified because it is perceived as marginal or not easily detected. To test these 
propositions, one could compare organizations characterized by high pressure and rewards 
with those that are more relaxed. In cases where the misconduct is serious, corrective 
measures could include threats to research funding, termination of employment or even 
criminal charges. However, more common is where it is implicitly understood that, if dubious 
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activities seemingly result in limited harm, then no great efforts are necessary to follow up 
and investigate them. However, such a ‘no harm, no foul’ attitude misses the wider 
implications of academic misconduct, where a ‘do as I say, not as I do’ attitude among 
faculty fails to convey appropriate ethical standards to students (Cabral-Cardoso, 2004; 
Cavanagh, 2009; Floyd et al., 2013). The rational choice perspective is hence rather limited 
when it comes to understanding and avoiding less blatant forms of research misconduct. 
Strain theory differs from rational choice perspectives by focusing on career concerns and the 
perceived risk of losing out to one’s peers as justification for dubious behaviour. To test our 
propositions here would therefore require understanding psychological factors such as how 
stressful circumstances create negative emotions (Lewellyn et al., 2017), which in turn are 
used to justify such behaviour. However, there remains the question whether career threats 
are indeed the true cause of misconduct or merely a post hoc justification. 
The propositions associated with cultural theories involve social norms that are influenced, 
for example, by level of education, social development and national characteristics 
(Monteduro et al., 2016). These propositions might be tested by examining the degree to 
which organizational cultures are competitive, or whether an organization’s norms, values 
and beliefs might lead some to conclude that certain forms of misconduct were acceptable. 
As Greve et al. (2010) note, it is the ethical perspective rather than procedural rules, threats or 
coercion (the focus of rational choice and strain theories) that should be the focus of such 
studies, particularly if the organizations involved foster a culture that outwardly condemns 
misconduct but implicitly supports it, provided it is not detected. 
Studies investigating the propositions derived from network theories of misconduct could 
compare how increased network collaboration in academia affects misconduct, especially 
when there are divergent expectations and pressures from different sources and 
organizational cultures (Breit and Forsberg, 2016). For example, studies comparing networks 
that are internally well connected but globally isolated could be conducted, specifically 
focusing on whether it is primarily individuals who influence the network (i.e. the ‘bad 
apples’ assumption) or vice versa (‘bad barrels’), as suggested by Ashforth et al. (2008). 
Studies relating to the propositions on complexity and bounded rationality could be 
conducted from various perspectives. One might assess whether increasingly complicated 
methodologies offer greater opportunities for misconduct. As Bennis and O’Toole (2005) and 
Banks et al. (2016) note, business school research has become quite theoretically 
sophisticated and methodologically complex. Hence, reviewers and editors may be unable to 
easily detect misconduct. Such research may also be too narrow or abstract to directly affect 
practitioners, with the result that misconduct may be seen as justified because it causes little 
real harm, and thus ‘no foul’. Another approach might be to explore whether relying on 
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specialist expertise opens up opportunities for misconduct, which in turn may depend on how 
far partners are trusted (Anderson et al., 2013). 
One overarching proposition related to complexity (not listed in the table) is whether 
misconduct can be attributed to a single factor, or whether it stems from several causes. We 
would suggest that misconduct is more likely to derive from a number of complex factors 
rather than a single cause, and then may be ‘justified’ in terms of other reasons. This points to 
a potential limitation of our theoretical framework, derived as it is from Greve et al.’s (2010) 
categorization of theoretical approaches to organizational misconduct. Nevertheless, by 
improving our understanding of why misconduct may occur, whom it affects and the direct 
and indirect impacts it may have, we hope to reduce its occurrence. 
This brings us to the limitations of our study and options for future research. First, the 
taxonomy presented here is not intended to provide a comprehensive list of all forms of 
misconduct and questionable behaviour. Indeed, new forms of misconduct will doubtless 
emerge as old ones become more easily detected and policed. Further research could explore, 
for example, how new technologies are utilized to engage in, detect or pre-empt misconduct. 
However, our classification of the main sources of misconduct and dubious behaviour, 
ranging from the most serious and unambiguous through to honest error, provides a 
framework to help understand why different types of misconduct emerge. As we have shown, 
misconduct in its various forms has adverse consequences for a range of stakeholders. By 
analysing and classifying the impacts, we have sought to explain why certain behaviours 
result in unfair advantage, providing a more complete picture of who the misconduct affects 
and how. However, further research and discussion within the research community is needed 
to clarify the sometimes ambiguous boundaries between appropriate and inappropriate 
research conduct, and to improve awareness so there is less scope for the unscrupulous to 
exploit current ambiguities. 
Secondly, our study was confined to business school research. Other fields may experience 
different problems with misconduct, so our findings may not be generalizable to all academic 
areas and circumstances. However, business schools provide a useful illustration because 
they exhibit a number of traits, including intense competitive pressures and significant 
incentives and rewards for gaming or pushing the boundaries in order to gain advantage. 
Such traits are likely to be prevalent (if not as extreme) in other fields, particularly those that 
are relatively fast-moving, and may be particularly pertinent with regard to ‘grey’ areas of 
misconduct. 
Thirdly, our taxonomy is derived mainly from an organizational studies perspective – a field 
with an extensive history of exploring misconduct – and specifically from Greve at al.’s 
(2010) categorization of the sources of misconduct. We recognize that other perspectives 
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such as those from psychology31, sociology or law, may also provide useful insights. In 
particular, a legal perspective could shed light on the jurisdictional dimension to the 
taxonomy, i.e. who should be responsible for monitoring and policing, and what legal 
measures could be employed.32 Indeed, since misconduct is often likely to involve a number 
of factors, exploring them through only one theoretical lens may not adequately explain the 
phenomenon. For example, collaboration is often hailed as a fruitful mechanism for 
generating new knowledge and research capabilities (as seen from the perspective of network 
theory) among research disciplines, regions/countries and industry/policy makers (cultural 
theories). However, increased incentives to collaborate (rational choice theory), coupled with 
more intense pressures to publish (strain theory), are likely to increase the number of co-
authors (complexity), some of whom may not be legitimate contributors or who may engage 
in collusion or gift authorship. 
In conclusion, the taxonomy developed here represents an attempt to achieve greater clarity 
with regard to research misconduct, particularly the more ambiguous forms. It is not intended 
to be a static framework, but rather to offer a starting point for understanding why research 
misconduct emerges, who it affects (both directly and indirectly) and to what degree. Indeed, 
we recognize that professional norms and rules need to respond to emerging new types of 
misconduct by those determined to cheat or game the system. By providing greater clarity, 
we seek to counter some of the excuses commonly used to justify misconduct, and to temper 
the more extreme forms of entrepreneurial risk-return/ rational choice outlook adopted by 
certain researchers and their organizations. We hope that the taxonomy presented here, and 
other articles in this special issue, can serve to discourage dubious behaviour and thus help to 
shape future good research practice. 
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Annex A: The influence of intense competition on misconduct – two case studies 
To illustrate the effects of competition on misconduct, we focus here on two cases, one 
mainly involving an individual, the other more focussed at the institutional level. 
Ulrich Lichtenthaler 
Ulrich Lichtenthaler carried out his PhD at WHU (the Otto Beisheim School of Management) 
in Germany. This study was singularly fruitful, yielding 20 or so publications. It was 
followed by his Habilitation study, which yielded a similar number of publications. Within 
six years, he had become one of the most prolific authors in technology and innovation 
management (TIM). He was publishing at a rate of 10 or so journal articles a year, i.e. 
approximately five times faster than the average for researchers in the field. In the 
Handelsblatt rankings of German-speaking business schools and their faculty, by 2009 
Lichtenthaler (then only 30) was already top for the under-40 category and in second position 
overall for the period since 2005 (Müller, 2009), and doubtless determined to reach the 
number one position as soon as possible. He was regarded as the rising star of business 
science in Germany (Storbeck, 2012). In 2011, Mannheim University sought a replacement 
for a chair previously held by one the Germany’s most eminent social scientists. At that time, 
Mannheim University was vying for top position in the Handelsblatt ranking. Lichtenthaler 
must therefore have seemed a very attractive ‘catch’ and he was duly appointed to the chair. 
However, in the wider TIM community, suspicions had already begun to be aroused. Many of 
the papers by Ulrich Lichtenthaler (UL) turned out to be very similar. Two researchers began 
an investigation of 15 articles published in leading management or innovation journals. This 
revealed two things: (1) UL papers failed to cite other similar or closely related UL papers – 
i.e. they appeared to be guilty of self-plagiarism; and (2) many papers suffered from a 
methodological problem of omitted variable bias. Thus, if Paper 1 investigated and 
demonstrated the relationship between variables A, B and C, while Paper 2 examined the 
relationship between variables B, C and D, then Paper 2 clearly suffered from omitted 
variable bias, since Paper 1 had already demonstrated how Variable A interacted with B and 
C. Whereas omitted variable bias is normally unintentional (in that the author was unaware 
that there was another variable affecting the relationship between the variables s/he was 
focussing on, or the omitted variable bias was unavoidable because there was no practical 
way of operationalizing that missing variable), in the case of UL’s papers the omitted 
variable bias was intentional and could have been overcome. Once the allegations had been 
fully investigated by certain journals (including Research Policy) and the misconduct proven, 
the first of UL’s papers were retracted.33 
                                                 
33 See e.g. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004873330800228X (accessed on 13 November 
2017). 
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About the same time, a third problem was identified with several UL papers, involving either 
misreported or deliberately exaggerated degrees of significance for the claimed statistical 
results (confirming a particular hypothesis or model). Subsequent investigations by other 
journals revealed just how pervasive these various problems were, and by 2015 16 of UL’s 
papers had been formally retracted.34 In addition, an investigation at WHU, where UL had 
carried out his PhD and Habilitation studies, revealed that the problems had been present in 
UL’s work from an early stage, and as a result WHU withdrew his Habilitation in 2014.35 
There was also a formal investigation at Mannheim University, at the end of which UL left 
his post in 2015.36 
What might have driven Lichtenthaler first of all to publish at such a prolific rate and, in 
order to achieve and maintain this, to engage in various forms of research misconduct? 
Initially, it was probably the desire to succeed in the fierce competition to obtain a faculty 
position in a leading business school. Later, it would probably have been to be appointed to a 
prestigious chair. And along the way, once it became clear how well he was doing in the 
Handelsblatt rankings, it was almost certainly a desire to do even better and to move up to No 
1 in these rankings that became all-consuming. Mannheim University was also caught up in 
competition over Handelsblatt rankings, vying for top position at the time with the University 
of Zurich.37 This may account for the reason why problems with UL’s work were not picked 
up when he was being considered for the Mannheim chair in 2011. Thus, institutional as well 
as individual level competition may well have been factors in this case. 
University of Missouri, Kansas City and Michael Song 
In 2012, an article in the Journal of Product Innovation Management (JPIM) reported an 
analysis of the field of innovation management (Yang and Tao, 2012). The paper identified 
the “world’s top innovation management scholars and universities” over the period 1991-
2010, updating an earlier analysis by Thieme (2007). Like Thieme, Yang and Tao claimed 
that the world’s top innovation management scholar was Michael Song, Director of the 
Institute for Entrepreneurship and Innovation (IEE) in the Bloch School of Management at 
the University of Missouri, Kansas City (UMKC). Furthermore, with regard to the 
institutional rankings, Yang and Tao concluded that the top innovation management 
                                                 
34 See http://retractionwatch.com/2014/10/10/after-16-retractions-management-professor-lichtenthaler-resigns-
post/ (accessed on 13 November 2017). 
35 See http://www.rhein-zeitung.de/region_artikel,-whu-erkennt-einstigem-starprofessor-lehrbefaehigung-ab-
_arid,1037700.html (accessed on 8 December 2016). 
36 See http://www.uni-
mannheim.de/1/presse_uni_medien/pressemitteilungen/2014/Oktober/Prof.%20Dr.%20Ulrich%20Lichtenthaler
%20verl%C3%A4sst%20die%20Universit%C3%A4t%20Mannheim/ (accessed on 13 November 2017). 
37 At the University of Zurich, the pressure on its professors to publish would presumably have been just as 
intense in order to strengthen the institution’s position in the Handelsblatt rankings. This may have been a factor 
in Bruno Frey’s decision to publish the Titanic study in four different journals. 
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university was the UKMC, ahead of other institutions such as MIT (ranked at No 2) and 
Harvard (No 5). Just before the article was published, UMKC issued a press release 
proclaiming that it was ranked ahead of other leading institutions such as Harvard.38 
For some, however, the findings were surprising if not downright suspicious. The 
methodology employed in the analysis involved several choices that were rather unusual and 
highly questionable. That raised the question of whether the specific methodological 
approach had been deliberately chosen to arrive at a particular conclusion. Moreover, it was 
later revealed that, because the paper had been published as a ‘Perspective’ rather than a 
normal research article, it had not gone through the normal peer review process. More 
seriously, the article failed to disclose that the two authors had been visiting scholars at 
UMKC during 2010-11 (UMKC, 2015, p.4). Such an interest should certainly have been 
declared, especially as the study’s methodology was questionable. Even more seriously, 
during a subsequent official investigation Michael Song admitted that he “may have written 
parts … of the paper” (ibid., p.14). Again, this rather crucial interest had not been disclosed at 
the time. 
Although a preliminary investigation by JPIM concluded that the paper’s methodology was 
not fundamentally flawed, once the failure of the authors to declare their interest in UMKC 
became known, along with Song’s role in drafting at least part of the paper, the journal issued 
a formal “expression of concern”, stating clearly that the journal did not “endorse or agree 
with any statements … made by UMKC about its ranking” (Barczak, 2015, p.655). 
UMKC and in particular its Bloch School of Management operated for years in an extremely 
competitive environment, competing for students, faculty and funding as well as reputation. 
The JPIM article provided a huge boost to this. Also vitally important was the Princeton 
Review ranking of its entrepreneurship program, which was crucial for recruitment of 
students and staff. The Princeton review ranking and the JPIM article were reported to have 
contributed towards obtaining a $32 million donation for a new building, while the Director 
received a lucrative salary of over $420,000 a year.39 
In 2015, following concerns uncovered by local newspaper40, an investigation by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) revealed that Bloch School officials had falsified data (for 
example, on enrolment figures, student clubs, and student start-ups) in their submissions to 
the Princeton Review Board (PRB). In particular, a senior university official admitted that he 
“felt pressured by the former IEI Director [Song] to do things that were improper in relation 
                                                 
38 See http://info.umkc.edu/blochnews/2011/12/05/umkc-ranked-no-1-in-the-world/ (accessed on 13 November 
2017). 
39 http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article10136273.html (accessed on 13 November 2017). 
40 It was alleged that a $32M donation from a patron was based on exaggerated rankings derived from the JPIM 
paper and the Princeton Review assessment scheme (KCS, 2014). 
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to PRB submissions” (UMKC, p.25). As a result, Princeton Review stripped UMKC of its 
2014 top-25 ranking and also those for the three previous years. Song resigned, and the Bloch 
School faculty voted to revoke all the rankings and awards that Song’s institute had received 
over the decade he had been the director (KCS, 2015) 
In this case, a mixture of competitive pressures were seemingly at work, some at the 
individual level (centring on Song), others at the institutional level and focusing on the 
relative standing of the UMKC management school. These were linked to the publication of a 
paper by two former UMKC visiting scholars with a contentious methodology claiming to 
place Song and UMKC in top position. More seriously, the intense competition resulted in 
officials at the Bloch School fabricating data to inflate their prospects in the Princeton 
Review of the school’s entrepreneurship program. Indeed, the PwC investigation revealed the 
Dean of the Bloch School had sent an email noting that “Henry Bloch gets very upset when 
our rankings go down. We must do everything we can to increase it when we can by all 
means necessary” (UMKC, 2015, p.22, emphasis added), which indicates the sort of 
pressures experienced by staff in order to keep the school’s largest sponsor happy (Jaschik, 
2015). 
